Abstract-In Part I of this two-part paper, a novel market mechanism is proposed to charge the uncertainty and credit the generation reserve in the Day-ahead market within a Robust Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (RSCUC) optimization framework. The increasing penetration of renewable energy and price-sensitive load in recent years have led to more uncertainties in power systems. These uncertainties have to be accommodated by flexible resources (i.e. upward and downward generation reserves). Robust optimization has been applied successfully to solving the unit commitment problem with uncertainties in recently years. However, one of the obstacles of applying RSCUC in real electricity markets is how to clear the market. In this paper, Uncertainty Marginal Prices (UMPs) in upward and downward directions are derived within the robust optimization framework. Both uncertainties and generation reserves are priced at UMPs, which leads to market equilibrium. We also find that, besides generation reserves, transmission reserves must be explicitly kept in the system within the robust optimization framework. We prove that transmission reserves may lead to Financial Transmission Right (FTR) underfunding issue within the existing market structure. The FTR underfunding issue can be resolved by introducing transmission reserve credits based on UMPs. 
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Index Terms-Cost
The scenario-based stochastic optimization and robust optimization are studied extensively to formulate and solve the problem [3] - [8] . The stochastic SCUC can be traced back to 90s [3] . The basic idea is to generate a set of samples based on the Probability Density Function (PDF) of the uncertainty parameters first, and then formulate and solve the new SCUC problem considering these samples. There have been several researches on how to determine LMPs and reserve prices within the stochastic SCUC framework [9] , [10] . There are two main possible drawbacks of stochastic SCUC. Firstly, The PDF information is normally unavailable. Secondly, due to the computational intractability, only a few sample points are modeled. Therefore, the system may not survive all the uncertainties. Recently, Robust SCUC (RSCUC) is proposed to overcome these drawbacks [5] - [7] , [11] . The largest merit is that the UC solution can be immunized against all the uncertainties. The key idea of the two-stage robust SCUC is to determine the optimal UC in the first stage which leads to the least cost for the worst scenario in the second stage. However, this approach is conservative and the Robust SCED (RSCED) is absent. Authors in [12] combined the stochastic and robust approach using a weight factor in the objective function to address the conservativeness issue. [13] , [14] employed the Affine Policy (AP) to formulate and solve the RSCED problem. Recently, we reported a new approach which tries to bridge the gap of RSCUC and RSCED [7] , [8] .
Although the RSCUC and RSCED are studied extensively, how to price the energy and related reserve is one of the main obstacles to applying them in the real market. A large number of works on pricing reserves exists within the traditional SCUC framework considering contingencies. They are normally modeled as co-optimization problem [2] , [15] . In [2] , the reserve is cleared on zonal levels. Instead of countable contingency, the infinite continuous uncertainties are considered in the RSCUC or stochastic SCUC. The generation reserve, also called flexible resource, is the key factor for both stochastic and robust optimization approaches. Recently, we proposed a new concept, Uncertainty Marginal Price (UMP), to price the uncertainty and flexibility for the intra-day or real-time market within the AP robust optimization framework [16] . In DAM, the main difficulty for pricing is that RSCED solution is absent in the traditional RSCUC [5] , [6] , [12] . In this paper, we propose a novel market mechanism to price the the energy, uncertainty, and flexibility simultaneously based on the RSCUC in [7] , [8] . As the SCED solution obtained is robust [7] , [8] , both marginal impacts of the uncertainty and flexibility are reflected in these prices. Flexible resources are entitled to proper credits based on their contribution to uncertainty management while uncertainty sources are charged based on UMPs. According to the market equilibrium analysis, market participants can get the maximal profit by following the ISO/RTO's instruction.
Both the robust UC and robust ED are obtained in the first stage solution where the base scenario is optimized in the RSCUC approach we employed in this paper [7] , [8] . In fact, it combines the reserve requirement in existing electricity market and the concept of RSCUC. The generation reserve and its deliverability are the main focus of this RSCUC framework. As the uncertainties are reflected in both the UC and ED solutions for the base scenario, we can employ the existing definitions to set the energy price (i.e. LMP) and generation reserves price [17] . Similar to its counterparts in real-time and intro-day markets [16] , the UMP in this paper is defined as the marginal cost of immunizing the next increment of uncertainty at a specific location. Load and generation is a pair, and they are priced at LMP. In this paper, uncertainty and flexibility (i.e., generation reserve) is another pair, and they are both priced at UMP. Both LMPs and UMPs may vary with the locations due to transmission congestions. Limited by the transmission capacity and power transfer distribution factor, sometimes the uncertainties at certain buses cannot be mitigated by the system-wide cheapest generation reserve, and expensive generation reserve, which is deliverable, has to be kept in the system. Therefore, uncertainty sources are charged and generation reserves are credited based on UMPs at the corresponding buses.
As the transmission reserve is kept within the RSCUC framework, the congestion component may exist in both the energy price and reserve price even if the physical limit of the line is not reached yet in the base scenario. Congestion fees are distributed to Financial Transmission Right (FTR) holders in the existing market according to the LMP difference and the FTR amount. The revenue inadequacy occurs when the congestion fee collected is smaller than the credit distributed to FTR holders, which is also called FTR underfunding. This has been a serious issue in recent years in the industry [18] , [19] . We reveal that transmission reserve will be another cause for FTR underfunding when physical transmission limit is adopted in Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT) for FTR market [18] , [20] , [21] . This conclusion is applicable to any robust SCUC framework for DAM.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows. 1) Marginal prices for generation reserves and uncertainties (i.e., UMPs) are derived within a robust SCUC framework. UMPs provide important price signals for both the market operation and investment related to uncertainty and flexibility. 2) It is revealed that the transmission reserve may cause FTR underfunding issues in the existing markets based on robust SCUC solutions.
3) A new mechanism to charge uncertainties and compensate the FTR underfunding is proposed. Load serving entities are charged only based on LMPs and energy consumptions. Costs of the generation reserves and transmission reserves are allocated to the uncertainty sources. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the formulation of the conventional SCUC is presented. Derivation of the UMP is presented in Section III based on RSCED, so is the market mechanism to charge and credit uncertainty. Case studies are presented in Part II of this paper.
II. TRADITIONAL SCUC FORMULATION
The objective of the ISOs/RTOs is to minimize the total operation cost to supply the load. It can be formulated as
where
is the fuel cost function in output level P it for unit i, and C I i (I it ) is the cost function related to the unit status I it . The objective function (1a) is subject to system generationload balance constraint, as formulated in (1b), where the total generation equals the total load.
where d m,t is the load demand at bus m at time t. The power loss is ignored in this paper. The transmission line flow constraint is modeled as
In the following context, we also denote the net power injection as P inj m,t .
The power generation is subject to the unit capacity limits (3a), and unit ramping up/down limits (3b-3c).
3c) where I i,t , y i,t , and z i,t are the indicators of the unit being on, started-up, and shutdown, respectively. Units also respect the minimum on/off time constraints which are related to these binary variables [1] .
III. RSCUC AND MARKET CLEARING
Recently, robust optimization is applied successfully to solve the SCUC problem with uncertainties. In [5] , [6] , the UC solution is robust against any uncertainty if all the load information is available when performing SCED. However, the robust dispatch solution is not specified and market clearing is not straightforward in DAM. Later, researchers employed Affinely Policy to define the re-dispatch strategy in SCED [13] , [14] . Recently, we proposes an economic and efficient RSCUC model with a fast solution approach [7] , [8] . One of the advantages is that both the UC and dispatch solutions are immunized against the uncertainty.
The motivation of this paper is to charge the uncertainty source and credit the generation reserve in RSCUC model. To our best knowledge, this is the first work on charging the uncertainties within the robust optimization framework in DAM. Hence, we focus on illustrating the concept with the following assumptions.
• Network loss is ignored.
• Uncertainty comes from the RES and price-sensitive load.
The traditional small deviations and contingencies are not considered in this paper.
• Uncertainty set can be truly formulated by the ISO/RTO.
• PDF information is unavailable for uncertainty.
A. RSCUC and RSCED
ISOs/RTOs desire to get the optimal UC and dispatch solution in the base-case scenario. They can re-dispatch the flexible resources, such as adjustable load demands and generators with fast ramping capabilities, to follow the load when deviation occurs (or uncertainty is revealed). Consistent with the robust literature [5] , [6] , the uncertainty set is modeled as
t is the budget parameter and assumed as an integer [6] . Let ∆P i,t denote the dispatch adjustment for accommodating uncertainties. It is noted that all the flexible resources are modeled as generators. In this paper, the RSCUC is formulated according to our latest models [7] , [8] .
(RSCUC) min (x,y,z,I,P )∈F t i
, minimum on/off time limit and F := (x, y, z, I, P ) : ∀ ∈ U, ∃∆P such that
The basic idea of the above model is to find a robust UC and dispatch for the base-case scenario. The UC and dispatch solution are immunized against any uncertainty ∈ U. When uncertainty occurs, it is accommodated by the generation adjustment ∆P i,t (4a). Generation dispatch is also enforced by the capacity limits (4b). Equation (4c) models the ramping rate limits of generation adjustment ∆P i,t . In fact, the right Algorithm 1 CG-based Procedure to Solve (RSCUC)
Solve (MP), obtain optimal (x,ŷ,ẑ,Î,P ).
4:
Solve (SP) with x =x, y =ŷ, z =ẑ,
and left hand sides of (4c) can correspond to a response time ∆T , which is similar to the 10-min or 30-min reserves in the literatures [22] . (4e) stands for the network constraint after accommodating the uncertainty.
Due to the transmission constraint and infinite possible uncertainties, (RSCUC) is a challenging problem. Column Generation (CG) based method is used to solve it [11] . Problem (MP) and (SP) are established as follows.
(MP) min (x,y,z,I,P,∆P )∈F t i
and (SP) Z := max
where K is the index set for uncertainty pointsˆ which are dynamically generated in (SP) with iterations. It should be noted thatˆ The details of solving the max-min problem (SP) can be found in [8] . One of the reasons that the Benders decomposition is not employed to solve RSCUC is that the k th pointˆ k obtained from (SP) has a clear physical meaning, i.e. the worst scenario given (x, y, z, I, P ). In CG based approach, we can explicitly model the constraint forˆ k . Once the procedure is converged, we also get the optimal UC and dispatch solution by solving (MP). Similar to traditional LMP calculation, we fix the binary variables as (x,ŷ,ẑ,Î). Then a convex linear programming problem (RSCED) can be formed as (RSCED) min P,∆P t i
subject to
B. Marginal Prices
In this section, marginal prices for the energy, uncertainty, and generation reserve are derived based on the Lagrangian function. Denote the Lagrangian function for (RSCED) as L(P, ∆P, λ, α, β, η), which is shown in (8) in the next page. It is noted that P inj m,t and ∆P inj,k m,t in (8) should be replaced by (2) and (5f), respectively, for price derivation. According to the definition of marginal price [17] , the LMP for energy at bus m is π e m,t = ∂L(P, ∆P, λ, α, β, η) ∂d m,t (11)
It is observed that the impact of the uncertainty is also reflected in the LMP. The new concept, UMP for DAM, is defined as the marginal cost of immunizing the next unit increment of uncertainty. For k , an extreme point of U, the UMP is
L(P, ∆P, λ, α, β, η)
Both the uncertainty and generation reserve are priced at π u,k m,t . It should be noted that (12) is intermediate price signals. The aggregated UMP at bus m and interval t exists in both upward and downward directions.
In order to get the aggregated UMPs, the following new sets are defined based on the direction of the uncertainty. respectively. It is possible that the upward and downward UMPs are different. In the following context, we will show how the the aggregated UMPs are used.
C. Uncertainty Charge and Credit
With the UMP, the charges and credits for the market participants associate with uncertainties become clear and fair in the DAM. The basic principle is those who cause uncertainties (uncertainty sources), such as RES and pricesensitive load, pay based on UMP and those who contribute to the management of uncertainties (uncertainty mitigators), such as generators or storage with ramping capabilities, get paid.
1) Charge to Uncertainty Source: Due to the good characteristic of the CG algorithm [11] , the extreme pointˆ k m,t and new variable ∆P k i,t is added in problem (MP). Therefore, the uncertainty source can be charged as
The uncertainty source pays based on the marginal price and the worst pointˆ Please check Appendix A for the proof. In this paper, the extreme pointˆ [8] , so the uncertainty charge in (15) can also be written as (16) according to Lemma 1 and (14) .
2) Credit to Generation Reserve: The generators with effective ramping capacity, storage, and adjustable load can be classified as generation reserve providers. It should be noted that the generation reserves are subject to the transmission capacity constraints. Only resources that can provide deliverable generation reserve are entitled to credits. If i ∈ G(m), then the credits can be formulated as
In other words, generation reserve is paid the UMP at the bus where it is located. If π 
and the downward generation reserve as
We also have the following lemma regarding the relationship between
Please check Appendix B for the proof. The credit to generation reserve i located at bus m (17) can be rewritten as (21) according to Lemma 2 and (14) .
(21) shows that the upward and downward generation reserves are credited separately. Flexible resources may receive credits for both the upward and downward generation reserves simultaneously.
3) Credit to Transmission Reserve: Some transmission capacity are reserved according to the solution to RSCED. These reserves are used to ensure the ramping deliverability when the uncertainty is revealed, as shown in (9f) and (9g). It is noted that they are determined automatically in RSCED, and kept explicitly without explicit transmission reserve requirement constraints Just like the "scheduled" generation reserve, the "scheduled" transmission reserve corresponding to the scheduled dispatch is obtained as
where | · | is the symbol of absolute value. The transmission reserve credit is
At most one ofη k l,t andη k l,t is non-zero for transmission l. The transmission reserve credit for line l at time t is zero when either k∈K (η k l,t +η k l,t ) = 0 or ∆f l,t = 0. The transmission reserve credit goes to the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) holders in the FTR market. In other words, it covers the FTR underfunding within the robust optimization framework. FTR is a financial instrument used to hedge congestion cost in the electricity market, where participants are charged or credited due to the transmission congestion [21], [23] .
The FTR underfunding is normally caused by the transmission capacity differences between the day-ahead market and real-time market [19] , [24] , [25] . Within the robust framework, the effective transmission capacity is different from the physical limit, which is used in the Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT) for FTR market [18] , [20] , [21] . Therefore, FTR underfunding will have a new cause in any RSCUC framework if the traditional SFT is used for the FTR market. We have the following theorem regarding the FTR underfunding. Theorem 1. If transmission capacity ∆f l,t is reserved for line l at time t in DAM, then the maximal FTR underfunding associated with line l at time t is
Proof. The congestion fee at t is
The first equality holds following the definition of net power injection. The second equality holds according to (11) and m P inj m,t = 0. The third equality holds following (22) . The sign change ofη l,t and lη k l,t in the third equation is because of the definition of power flow direction. The credits to FTR holders (m→n) (π e m,t − π e n,t )FTR m→n can be rewritten as
Two cases are considered as follows.
1) If ∆f l,t is non-zero, thenη l,t andη l,t must be zeros. In this case, the congestion fee related to l at t is
And the credits to FTR holders are
The first equality holds followingη l,t =η l,t = 0. The inequality is true as the amount of FTR m→n respects
according to the SFT for FTR market [18] , [20] , [21] . Hence, the maximal credit to FTR holders is
Comparing with the congestion fee in (25) , the FTR underfunding is (24) . 2) If ∆f l,t is zero, the congestion fee related to l at t is
which is the same as the maximal FTR credit. Hence, FTR underfunding is 0 at t for l. Proof. According to Theorem 1, the FTR underfunding value is (24) . Therefore, we need to prove that the money collected from uncertainty sources can cover the FTR underfunding and credits to generation reserve.
Without loss of generality, we consider the payment collected from uncertainty sources at time t forˆ
The first equality holds according to (11) . The second equality holds from (9a), (9f), and (9g). Therefore,
the payment collected from uncertainty sources can cover all the credits to the generation and transmission reserves.
Remark 1. The load serving entity without uncertainty does not have the liability to pay the extra reserve fee. The cost of the generation reserves is allocated to the uncertainty sources. Therefore, the uncertainty sources have the incentives to reduce the uncertainties. On the other hand, generation and transmission reserves get the proper credits due to their contribution to the management of the uncertainties.
Remark 2. In this section, the upward and downward UMPs are obtained according to (14) , respectively. The uncertainty sources are charged according to (16) 
D. Market Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the competitive market equilibrium model. In the electricity industry, the partial market equilibrium model is employed [1] , [26] , where market participants are price takers [27] .
1) Market Clearing: The energy is cleared according to (8a). Uncertainty and generation reserve are cleared according to (9a).
2) Profit Maximization Problem for Market Participant: Without loss of generality, consider unit i located at bus m. Its profit maximization problem can be formulated as
where the decision variable is P i,t given the price signal (18) and (19) . According to (20) , we can rewrite generation reserve credit as
Substituting (26) into problem (PMP i ), we can decouple P i,t and (Q up i,t , Q down i,t ). In fact, we also get all terms related to P i,t in Lagrangian L(P, λ, α, β, η) for problem (RSCED). Since the problem (RSCED) is convex and Slater's condition is satisfied, the strong duality holds. Therefore, the saddle point P i,t , which is the optimal solution to (RSCED), is also the optimal solution to (PMP i ). Consequently, unit i is not inclined to change its generation output level as it can obtain the maximum profit by following the ISO's dispatch instruction P i,t . Price signal π e m,t provides the incentives for unit i to dispatch power output toP i,t , and price signal π Generation reserve prices are the same for the units at the same bus, and they may vary with locations if line congestions exist. Secondly, higher generation reserve price attracts long-term investment for flexibility resources. Thirdly, it is consistent with the existing reserve pricing practice [2] , [28] . In fact, generation reserve price is consistent with the UMP. Therefore, the uncertainties and flexibilities are also treated fairly at the same bus.
Remark 3. The market mechanism proposed in this paper follows the cost causation principle for the cost allocation. In reality, it may be controversial to allocate the reserve cost to uncertainty sources. However, we argue that it would be fair and must be done when the RES penetration level is high. An extreme case is when the loads are all supplied by RES. There has been study showing it is possible that the increasing RES penetration can cause higher system operation cost. This issue cannot be handled by the existing market mechanism, in which loads pay for the additional system reserve that is required to accommodate the uncertainty from RES. In other words, loads are actually providing subsidies to RES. When the RES penetration level is low, the subsidies can help the growth of the RES. However, when the RES penetration level is high, these growing subsidies will cause serious fairness issue. On the other hand, with UMP as the stimulating price signals, RES will have the incentives to improve its forecast techniques and reduce its uncertainty. In the ideal case when its uncertainty approaches zero, RES will no longer pay.
Remark 4. The pricing for uncertainties proposed in this paper is not in conflict with the pricing for traditional regulation and spinning reserves. If additional constraints related to traditional regulation and spinning reserves are included, the traditional reserve prices can be derived in the framework and the corresponding reserve costs can still be allocated to LSEs.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the existing market, spinning and operation reserve are often modeled in the SCUC problem for considering contingencies [2] , [22] . These contingencies are discrete and countable uncertainties, which are different from the continuous and infinite uncertainties discussed in this paper such as those from RES or price-sensitive load. The robustness and fairness are not maintained in the existing reserve market with high penetration of uncertainty sources.
The novel market model in this paper clears uncertainty, energy, and generation reserve simultaneously. As the market mechanism is established within the robust optimization framework, the robustness of the dispatch is guaranteed. The reserves obtained are the minimum ones required by the system to accommodate the uncertainties. The UMP proposed in this paper can effectively address the issue on how to charge and credit the uncertainties and generation reserve fairly in the market with RES and price-sensitive load. The LSEs are not charged the reserve price. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Assume i ∈ G(m), according to the KKT condition
